Mean field games is a recent branch of game theory which proposes to use the tools of physics inside the classical economic axiomatic, to explain (and not only to describe) social and economic phenomena. This means that the agents are rational and are not regarded as just gas particles,or as robots applying some predetermined behavioral strategy: strategic choices are endogenous in the models as they are in game theory. The applications of this theory cover a wide range of social life and economic problems.
The talks will describe different approaches to the analysis and simulation of mean field games and some related problems.
Mean Field Games and Related Topics - 2
The meeting will be a continuation of the first workshop on Mean Fields Games and Related Topics, Rome, May 12-13 2011.
Y. Achdou (Université Paris Diderot)
D. Bauso (Università di Palermo)
N. Bellomo (Politecnico di Torino)
A. Bensoussan (The University of Texas and
City University of Hong Kong)
P. Caines (McGill University, Montreal)
F. Camilli (Sapienza Università di Roma)
P. Cardaliaguet (Université Paris-Dauphine)
G. Carlier (Université Paris-Dauphine)
R. Carmona * (Princeton University)
F. Delarue (Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)
M. Fornasier (Technische Universität München)
D. Gomes (Universidade Técnica de Lisboa and
K.A.U.S.T. Saudi Arabia)
O. Guéant (Université Paris Diderot)
M. Huang (Carleton University, Ottawa)
V. Kolokoltsov (University of Warwick)
J.-M. Lasry (Université Paris-Dauphine)
P.-L. Lions (Collége de France and Université Paris-Dauphine)